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Abstract 
The main aim of this paper is to compare the experience of regulation and 
restructuring in the Greek and the Turkish electricity industries. For this purpose, 
a comparison of data on the two industries is employed. A quantitative analysis of 
the impact of restructuring these two countries’ presented and complemented with 
an evaluation of relevant legislation, policy changes and regulation scores. The 
paper shows that the electricity industries in Turkey and Greece have undergone a 
radical restructuring, but which remains an ongoing process. The main conclusion 
is that the two industries face number of challenges, and that institutional and 
political reforms ensuring the smooth functioning of the electricity industries thus 
need to be enacted. In addition, there is a crucial need for a debate about 
regulatory principles for the industry in both countries.  
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ELEKTRİK ENDÜSTRİSİ REGÜLASYONU VE YENİDEN 
YAPILANMASINA DAİR BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA:  
YUNANİSTAN VE TÜRKİYE 
Öz 
Bu makalenin amacı, Yunanistan ve Türk elektrik endüstrilerinin regülasyon ve 
yeniden yapılanma tecrübelerinin karşılaştırılmasıdır. Bu amaca yönelik söz 
konusu iki endüstrinin verilerinin karşılaştırılması tercih edildi. Bu endüstrilerdeki 
yeniden yapılanmanın etkisi niceliksel analizle gösteriliyor. Bu analiz, iki ülkenin 
elektrik endüstrilerindeki yasal ve politika değişimleri ile regülasyon skorlarını 
kapsayan bir değerlendirmeyle tamamlanmaktadır. Makale, hem Türkiye hem de 
Yunanistan’daki elektrik endüstrilerinin radikal yeniden yapılanma içinde 
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bulunduklarını ve bu sürecin hala devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Makalenin en 
önemli sonucu söz konusu elektrik endüstrilerinin çok sayıda problem ile karşı 
karşıya olduğudur. Dolayısıyla, bu iki elektrik endüstrisinin gerektiği şekilde 
işleyişinin sağlanabilmesi için kurumsal ve politik reformlara devam edilmesi 
gerekmektedir. Buna ilave olarak, Yunanistan ve Türk elektrik endüstrilerinin 
regülasyon prensipleri üzerine ciddi bir tartışmanın yürütülmesi de elzemdir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Elektrik endüstrisi, regülasyon, yeniden yapılanma, 
Yunanistan, Türkiye 
 
Introduction 
Many countries from different regions and income levels have initiated a 
restructuring of their electricity industries since the 1980s, and for a variety of 
motives (Camadan, 2011: 70). While operation of the electricity sector has been 
performed by the private sector subject to regulation since the development of 
electricity supply, such activities of the electricity sector have historically been 
considered a public service in Europe and performed by the state. In general, prices 
have been determined below the actual costs of production and delivery and used 
as a medium for economic and social policies. From the 1980s, however, along 
with advancements in turbine technology and developments in the information 
sector, there has been widespread adoption and application of the idea that 
competition is possible and economically efficient at the level of production. 
Finally, in many countries across the world, it has been recognised that the 
traditional vertically integrated structure of the sector can be done away with also, 
the industry separated and competition established at the production level 
employed to set up a structure whereby network activities may be rearranged 
through the implementation of market reforms (EMRA, 2010: 51). 
In many countries, electricity services have been provided by vertically 
integrated enterprises operating as publicly owned monopolies that encompass 
generation, transmission and distribution activities. Many power sector reform 
programmes, particularly in those countries where the power industry has been 
organised, as it is in Turkey and Greece, have therefore been focused on moving 
from a monopoly to either a single buyer model (SBM) or directly to a wholesale 
competition model. 
The Greek electricity industry is an example of such structural reform. Many of 
the changes incorporated in a 1999 law there were made to comply with Greece’s 
obligations under the EU Electricity Directive (OECD, 2001a: 24), with the initial 
market design year for Greece set at 2001. Meanwhile, in February 2001, Turkey 
passed its long-anticipated Electricity Market Law, paving the way for a free 
market in power generation and distribution. This came in the context of Turkey’s 
effort to join the EU, which also included the incorporation of numerous EU 
energy laws and standards into the country’s national energy legislation. 
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Furthermore, at a transnational level, greatly improved relations between Greece 
and Turkey enabled not only an economic but also energy cooperation (Koroneos 
and Nanaki, 2007: 3826-3827). 
The main purpose of this paper is to compare the experience of regulation and 
restructuring in the Greek and the Turkish electricity industries. These two national 
industries are taken as case studies because the timing of their initial market 
designs (2001) and the main reason for their reforms (EU obligations) were the 
same, while their energy cooperation is also important and, furthermore, both 
countries are still in the transitional period.1 
Investigating issues around this, the present paper is composed of five sections. 
The first section details the research methodology. The second section examines 
thepolicy changes, characteristics and performance of the Greek electricity industry 
and the third section does the same for the Turkish electricity industry. The fourth 
section provides a comparison of the experience of regulation and restructuring in 
the Greek and the Turkish electricity industries, with some concluding remarks 
offered in the last section. 
1. Research Methodology 
Jamasb et al. (2004) and other scholars emphasise that there is a deficiency of 
generally accepted and measured indicators with which to examine the progress, 
impacts and performance of electricity sector reforms. Since the aim of this paper 
is to compare the regulation and restructuring experience of the Turkish and Greek 
electricity sectors, the same deficiency is encountered. Therefore, instead of using 
an econometric model, a comparison and evaluation of data on the Turkish and 
Greek electricity sectors is employed. The impact of restructuring in these 
industries is presented using a quantitative analysis of (i) performance of recent 
price levels (for household consumers and industrial consumers); (ii) market 
structure (market share of the largest generator, number of main electricity 
generating companies and degree of market opening); and (iii) degree of private 
involvement. The quantitative analysis is complemented with an evaluation, which 
includes legislation and policy changes and regulation scores for the two countries’ 
electricity industries.  
The electricity data was collected from various international sources, including 
Eurostat, Eurelectric, the OECD and IEA, along with MENR (Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources) and EMRA (Energy Market Regulatory Authority) from 
Turkey and also various articles and papers. Data is supplied for as late as 2013.  
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2. Policy Changes, Characteristics and Performance of the Greek 
Electricity Industry  
2.1. Policy Changes  
Reform in the electricity sector in Greece is mainly driven by its obligations 
under EU rules for the internal market for electricity (OECD, 2001b, 40). The 
development of a liberalised electricity market in here began with the enactment of 
Law 2773/1999, harmonising national legislation with the EU Directive 96/92/EC. 
This law established new entities within the electricity sector in the country, 
including the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) and the Hellenic 
Transmission System Operator (HTSO), as well as gave general directions for the 
creation of a competitive electricity market. The initial market design in the year 
2001 was not considered successful, at least in terms of opening the market to new 
players, because of the existence of the incumbent utility, the Public Power 
Corporation (PPC), with a market share of over 99% in both generation and supply 
(Sakellaris et al., 2010: 1). 
The state-owned PPC was created in 1950 as a vertically integrated company, 
with 49% of its publically issued shares held by institutional investors, including 
4% held by the PPC employee insurance fund, and the remainder belonging to the 
Greek state, which was legally bound to remain the majority shareholder (Iliadou, 
2009: 80). The PPC retained its dominant position through to 2010 (RAE, 2011: 
20). The PPC retail market share fell from 100% in 2009 to approximately 92.3% 
in 2011, but by 2012 it had recovered to 98.5% (Kalantzis & Sakellaris, 2012: 3, 
Danias et al., 2013: 1043). 
According to the initial provisions of Law 2773/1999, legal unbundling was 
introduced only for the operation of the transmission system. The related 
responsibilities were assigned to the Hellenic Transmission System Operator S.A. 
(HTSO), a majority state-owned company, with 49% of its shares belonging to the 
PPC. Then, as provided by Law 3426/2005, in July 2007, the HTSO also acquired 
the responsibility for operation of the distribution network, with exception of that 
located on the non-interconnected islands; HTSO was then renamed the Hellenic 
Transmission and Distribution Systems Operator (HTDSO) (Iliadou, 2009: 80).  
As the Greek electricity market featured one dominant player, the PPC, 
controlling about 95% of the generation market and 100% of the supply market, it 
was deemed important from the beginning to design a market that would facilitate 
the entrance of new participants and restrict the PPC’s dominant market power 
(RAE, 2010: 32). The Greek wholesale electricity market has been organised as a 
pure mandatory pool since its inception in 2005, but after gradual refinements, a 
transitional market design, implemented over a five-year period, was substituted on 
30th September 2010 in its (provisionally) final form. The revised market design, 
known as the ‘5th Reference Day’, reflected the full implementation of the 2005 
Grid and Market Operation Code (RAE, 2014), also provided for a number of 
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additional procedures to prevent market abuse, protect the integrity of the market 
and strengthen public confidence (RAE, 2010: 32). 
The electricity market in Greece was opened on 19th February, 2001, but with 
rather insignificant practical consequences. This was mainly due to the regulated 
tariffs that the PPC was obliged to apply, since, as they were often below cost, new 
entry into the supply business was made almost impossible (Iliadou, 2009: 82). 
The main responsibility with regard to the energy industry is entrusted to the 
Minister of Development, which includes the Department of Energy and Natural 
Resources. The other ministry involved in energy policy issues is the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, which is responsible for environmental policy and 
licensing, while one other public institution is involved in energy issues, the 
Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) (Iliadou, 2009: 77). The RAE is an 
independent administrative authority, which enjoys, by the provisions of the law 
establishing it (Law 2773/1999), financial and administrative independence (RAE, 
2012). 
The powers and responsibilities of the RAE are as follows (RAE, 2012): 
1) To monitor and control the operation of the energy market and propose to 
the competent bodies the necessary measures required to comply with 
competition rules and consumer protection; 
2) To provide opinion regarding the granting of authorisations and control 
the exercise of rights granted under the authorisations; 
3) To collect and evaluate information required for the fulfilment of its 
duties regarding entities active in the energy sector; 
4) To impose fines on violators of this and other acts issued in accordance 
with this law, including the Grid Code and other Codes; 
5) To co-operate with corresponding authorities in other countries or 
international organisations. 
However, RAE lacked full independence and sufficient powers to execute 
effectively, like many independent regulatory authorities in the world. Thus, a 
more independent and active role is required by RAE. Moreover, Greece has been 
in a deep economic crisis, which has operated as a major barrier to use the RAE’s 
full use of its powers and implementation of responsibilities. 
2.2. Characteristics of the Greek Electricity Market 
After the establishment of the PPC in 1950 and its absorption of smaller, local 
Greek electricity firms after 1956, the Greek electricity industry was organised as a 
vertically integrated state-owned monopoly. In this monopolistic market, the PPC 
covered all electricity industry activities in Greece: it owned and operated all the 
infrastructure and the assets of the industry (Danias et al., 2013: 1040).  
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With the structural changes in the Greek electricity market accompanying 
liberalisation, the PPC was split into two. One firm retained the name ‘PPC’ and 
controlled the potentially competitive activities of the market (electricity 
generation and supply) as well as electricity distribution. The other firm was called 
the ‘Hellenic Transmission System Operator’ (HTSO). This firm controlled and 
operated the electricity transmission system, held the daily electricity auctions and 
was also responsible for the operation of the wholesale electricity market. These 
two firms were both further split in 2011 by Law 4001/ 2011, resulting in four 
firms. The PPC has kept the competitive activities of the market (electricity 
generation and supply) and a new firm, the Hellenic Electricity Distribution 
Network Operator (HEDNO), owns and is responsible for the operation of the 
electricity distribution network. HTSO was also split in two firms, the Operator of 
Electricity Market (OOEM), which operates the wholesale electricity market, and 
the Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO), which owns and operates 
the electricity transmission network. However, it is important to point out that the 
Greek government maintains effective ownership and control over these four firms 
(Danias et al., 2013: 1041-1042). 
2.3 Performance of the Greek Electricity Market 
Coal and peat are the most important source for electricity generation in 
Greece, providing 52% of the total gross generation in 2011. Gas is another power 
source, providing 23% in 2011, with total renewable sources other than hydro 
providing 9%, hydro 7% and then oil 9% of the 2011 total (EIA, 2014a). 
Maroulis noted that recent years have seen considerable improvements in 
relation to the liberalisation of electricity markets. Nevertheless, a properly 
competitive market is not in place, and the purely dominant monopolistic role of 
the PPC has been criticized by competitors (Maroulis, et al., 2011: 14), despite a 
2007 ministerial decision obliging it to reform the tariff system (OECD/IEA, 
2011a: 116). 
According to RAE reports and studies, the reluctance of new investors to enter 
the industry was mainly related to high investment risk due to the market 
concentration and the institutional and regulatory framework in place (Chalvatzis 
& Hooper, 2009: 2705). Thus, reforms to liberalise the wholesale electricity market 
are underway. The current situation shows the government to be taking several 
steps, although further progress is needed:  
1) Measures to open up the lignite-fired electricity sector are in progress; 
2) The awarding of hydro reserves management needs to be further 
specified; 
3) The government has started to implement a new system of regulated 
tariffs; 
4) The unbundling of network activities is experiencing delays (EC, 2011: 
36-37). 
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Undoubtedly, 2010 was a milestone year for the development and opening up 
of both the electricity and gas markets in Greece. The electricity wholesale market 
reached its final structural and operational pattern in September 2010, after the five 
year transitional period (RAE, 2011: 3). 
     The electricity retail market became fully open in 2007, and there has been 
some progress in reforming retail tariffs, such as deregulation for larger customers 
and the separate identification of public service obligation costs and network 
charges. However, below-cost tariffs and cross-subsidies are major impediments to 
competition in electricity supply, as has been witnessed over past few years 
(OECD/IEA, 2011b: 120). In the midst of its severe economic crisis, Greece 
liberalised low-voltage electricity tariffs. In order to protect vulnerable consumers 
(suffering from energy poverty), the government introduced the Social Household 
Tariff (SHT) in January 2011, giving a discount of approximately 40% from the 
normal household bill on annual consumption of up to 5000 kilowatt hours (EIA, 
2014b: 41). 
     Meeting the obligations under the third EU Electricity Market Directive will 
improve the current situation. Another area where reform is urgently needed is in 
moving to cost-reflective end-user tariffs. A strong and independent regulator is 
required to mitigate PPC’s dominance, ensure non-discriminatory treatment for 
independent power producers (IPPs) and provide regulatory certainty for investors 
in a competitive energy market. In general, investment and competition are needed 
to ensure the financial efficiency of the electricity sector (OECD/IEA, 2011a: 10). 
3. Policy Changes, Characteristics and Performance of the Turkish 
Electricity Industry             
     3.1 Policy Changes 
Electricity restructuring has been driven by a privatisation strategy and the 
revenues that can be generated from privatisation rather than a desire to instil 
healthy competition in the sector. The key strategic role given to privatisation in 
the restructuring process has also led the Turkish authorities to initiate 
restructuring in the distribution segment, where the possibilities of competition are 
limited, rather than generation, where the real productivity gains would be 
expected in the medium term (Atiyas et al., 2012 : 7). In this regard, the first 
restructuring attempt can be mentioned to have been fulfilled in 1993 by the 
unbundling of the sector-dominating state-owned Turkish Electricity Authority 
(TEK) into two entities, the Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Co. 
(TEAS) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Co. (TEDAS). TEAS was given 
responsibility for the generation, transmission and wholesale supply of electricity, 
while TEDAS undertook the distribution activities (Karahan & Toptas, 2013: 615).  
During the late nineties, the candidacy for EU accession application process 
provided the main structure for the steps taken. Thus, power sector reform was 
designed from the start within the framework of EU accession, and harmonization 
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of energy legislation with the corresponding EU legislation gave impetus to 
liberalisation efforts in the power sector (Erdogan, et al., 2008: 1). In February 
2001, the Turkish Electricity Market Law (Law No. 4628) was enacted. This 
provided a new and a radically different legal framework for the design of 
electricity markets and established the Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA) (Cetin and Oguz, 2007: 1764). The main objective of the law can be 
stated as “providing affordable, sustainable and quality electricity to consumers in 
a competitive environment” (Karahan &Toptas, 2013: 615).  
According to the law of 2001, in cases where consumers in certain regions 
and/or in line with certain objectives need to be supported, such subsidy is 
provided in the form direct cash refunds to consumers without affecting prices. The 
amount, procedure and principles of these refunds are established by the Council of 
Minister upon the proposal of Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
(Özkıvrak, 2005: 1345). In fact, the idea that subsidies would not affect prices was 
not really a logical expectation, and this kind of implementation was not in 
compliance with liberalisation efforts. 
With the enactment of Electricity Market Law, the Turkish Electricity 
Generation & Transmission Co. (TEAS) was unbundled into three state-owned 
enterprises: TEIAS (Transmission), TETAS (wholesale) and EUAS (Generation) 
(Durakoğlu, 2011: 5582). According to Law No. 3154, the purpose of the Ministry 
of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) is to help define targets and policies 
related to energy and natural resources in a way that serves and guarantees the 
defence of Turkey, promotes its security and welfare, strengthens its economy and 
ensures that energy and natural resources are researched, developed, generated and 
consumed in a way that is compatible with these targets and related policies 
(MENR, 2014). 
EMRA has administrative and financial autonomy in theory, like many 
independent regulatory authorities in Turkey. In fact, however, most of the 
independent regulatory authorities have lacked full independence to effectively 
execute their roles. In addition to electricity and natural gas markets, EMRA 
regulates the petroleum and LPG markets and, moreover, collects revenues from 
these markets. It collects its revenues principally from electricity and gas licensing 
fees and from a (maximum 1%) surcharge on electricity transmission, the Third 
Party Access tariff (TPA). The main functions of EMRA include: 
        1) Setting up and maintaining a new licensing framework, 
        2) Preparing secondary legislation, 
        3) Enforcing regulated third party access (rTPA), 
        4) Applying a new transmission and distribution code, 
        5) Determining eligible customers over time, 
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6) Regulating tariffs for transmission and distribution activities, as well as 
provision of retail services to noneligible customers, 
        7) Regulating the wholesale tariff of TETAS, 
        8) Performing tenders for gas distribution networks, 
        9) Monitoring the performance of all actors in the market, 
      10) Protecting customer rights, 
11) Applying sanctions to parties that violate the rules (Erdogdu, 2007: 
987). 
Since Law 4628 took effect on 3rd March, 2001, Turkey has taken substantial 
steps toward creating a competitive and functioning market in the electricity 
energy sector, restructuring public institutions operating in the sector and 
implementing market rules to ensure its liberalisation. A short- and medium-term 
roadmap for sector reform and privatisation, the Electricity Energy Sector Reform 
and Privatisation Strategy Paper was made public on March 17th, 2004. Within the 
scope of this plan, required regulations were finalised, transitional balancing and 
reconciliation initiated, transitional contracts finalised, the price equalisation 
mechanism initiated, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) power plants transferred to 
EUAS, EUAS portfolio groups formed in preparation for privatisation, TEDAS 
included in the privatisation programme and tender procedures initiated after 
establishing the methodology for privatising distribution. Creating a competitive 
market in the electricity energy sector requires a transitional period. To this end, a 
transitional period was established in July 2008 through Law 5784 of 09.07.2008 
(EMRA, 2010: 104), and the Electricity Energy Market and Supply Security 
Strategy Paper (2009) was drafted, keeping in mind transitional needs and actions 
(DPT, 2009: 3). 
The Turkish parliament decided to further improve the electricity market 
structure and in March 2013 introduced a new market law, Law No. 6446, while 
Law No. 4628 became an organisational law for EMRA. Law No. 6446 determines 
the framework of the Turkish electricity market. The electricity market is based on 
bilateral agreements complemented with the balancing and settlement market. The 
private sector may participate in all segments of the electricity market, except for 
transmission, by obtaining relevant licenses from EMRA. Non-discriminatory third 
party access to the network also falls under the supervision of EMRA. Market 
activities other than, network activities are also open to competition under the 
supervision and regulation of EMRA (Gözen, 2014: 275-76). 
Erdogan et al. (2008: 6) suggested that the Balancing and Settlement 
Regulation (BSR) can be considered a milestone on the road of liberalisation, since 
for the first time in the history of the country, electricity prices were allowed to 
evolve in the market.  
74                                 A COMPARISON OF ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY REGULATION 
 
The balancing and settlement system began to operate as of August 2006. Since 
then, electricity spot prices have been established by market forces. The final 
balancing and settlement system has been in operation since December 1, 2011. 
The new system is based on day-ahead market and hourly settlement with the 
participation also of the demand side. According to the new system, two sets of 
marginal prices are determined and published: one is for the day-ahead market and 
the other for real-time balancing.  
Although the legal framework and market design are in place and mainly 
comply with that of the EU, Turkey faced some difficulties in applying the 
legislation. Consequently, policymakers in Turkey opted for a transitional period 
before the market structure as outlined in the Law No. 6446 is fully applied. 
Difficulties resulting from the dominant position of state-owned enterprises, 
incomplete privatisation of state-owned generation, high level of technical and 
commercial losses in the network, and the stranded liabilities of the previous 
period due to agreements of built-operate, built-operate-transfer and transfer of 
operating rights were signed between the Turkish government and private 
investors. As part of the transitional period in electricity retail sales, a national 
tariff system supported by a price equalisation mechanism is being applied all over 
Turkey until the end of 2015 (Gözen, 2014: 275-76).  
Turkish electricity market legislation can be categorised into three groups 
(Herdem, 2014: 11): 
      1) Electricity Market Law 
• Electricity market opened to competition and to private sector companies, 
• Energy stock exchange (EPİAŞ) established, 
• Wholesale and retail licenses combined under supply license, 
• Pre-license procedure established for manufacturing license applicants, 
• Privatization of electricity distribution and manufacturing authorities 
regulated. 
 
       2) Electricity Market Licence Regulation 
• License requirement for each market activity established, 
• License exemptions provided to stated electricity manufacturers, 
• License application procedures regulated. 
• Consumers option to determine supplier protected (through 28.01.2014 
amendment). 
 
        3) Unlicensed Power Generation Regulation 
• License exemptions for electricity manufacturers regulated. 
• Cogeneration units made not subject to 1MW installed capacity limit, 
• Examination terms for connection applications regulated, 
• Purchase guarantee of surplus manufactured electricity regulated, 
• Transformation from licensed manufacturing into unlicensed 
manufacturing under certain conditions enabled. 
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3.2. Characteristics of the Turkish Electricity Market 
In 2001, the government enacted the Electricity Market Law to set up a 
comprehensive electricity reform program. Under the law, the state-owned Turkish 
Electricity Generation and Transmission Corporation (TEAS) was split into 
separate generation, transmission, distribution and trade companies, with a goal of 
eventual privatisation of the generation and trade companies. Turkey has taken 
steps to create competitive wholesale trading and retail sales markets and plans to 
open the market for all customers by 2015. In addition, retail tariffs were changed 
to reflect the cost of generation, transmission and distribution without subsidies. 
The 2001 law created the Energy Markets Regulatory Authority (EMRA) as the 
regulator of the electricity market. It is tasked with issuing licenses for all market 
activities related to the electricity market, determining and approving regulated 
tariffs, and setting the eligibility limit for market opening. In addition, it is 
involved in drafting legislation affecting electricity markets, resolving disputes, 
and applying penalties. In March 2013, the Turkish government passed a new 
Electricity Market Law, establishing an independent regulatory and auditing 
mechanism for the electricity market. 
The largest generation company is the state-owned Electricity Generation 
Company (EUAS), which controls about half of all generation in Turkey. The 
remaining generation is provided by independent power producers and firms given 
special state concessions to build and operate power plants. 
Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEIAS) is the publicly owned 
enterprise that owns and operates the transmission system and is legally unbundled 
(EIA, 2014c: 13). 
3.3   Performance of the Turkish Electricity Market 
In 2012, the total installed capacity in Turkey was 56.1 GWe. In 2011, 
Turkey’s electricity generation came from three main sources: gas (45.3%), coal 
and peat (28.8%) and hydro (22.81%) (EIA, 2014a).  
The electricity market was launched on March 3, 2003. All customers directly 
connected to the transmission system as well as consumers with consumption of 
more than 4.500 kWh/year for 2014 are deemed eligible. The corresponding 
theoretical degree of market opening on the demand side is 85%. Under the 
provisions of Laws No. 4628 and 6446, EMRA lowered the eligibility limit from 9 
million kWh/year in 2003 to 4.500 kWh/year in 2014. In order to enhance market 
openness on the consumption side, it was expected that the limit would reach zero 
for all consumers by the beginning of 2015, meaning that all consumers would be 
free to select their own power suppliers from 2015 (Gözen, 2014: 276- 77). 
Electricity prices in Turkey covered the substantial cross-subsidisation from 
consumers in the western regions to those in the eastern and also from industrial 
users to households. Actually, EMRA, TEDAS, the Treasury and the Ministry of 
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Energy and Natural Resources reached an agreement on transition from the 
national tariff structure applied in Turkey to the regional tariff structure, but the 
government did not accept this agreement due to political pressures by consumers 
in the east (Özkıvrak, 2005: 1348). This implementation thus became a major 
obstacle for the liberalisation effort, besides EMRA’s independence.  
A trial synchronous parallel connection of the Turkish national electricity 
system operated by TEIAS to the ENTSO-E Continental Synchronous Regional 
Network of Europe was enacted on September 18th, 2010. In the near future, the 
Turkish national electricity network was to allow international trading of the 
electrical energy in a synchronous parallel connection with the Greek and 
Bulgarian national networks. Making the national electricity network synchronous 
with other networks requires amendments in the electricity market legislation with 
respect to the international trading of electricity. In this context, a revision was 
planned in the Electricity Market Import and Export Regulation (EMRA, 2010: 26-
27). In September 2013, the synchronous trial operation of the Turkish system with 
the system of Continental Europe was formally extended by one year. In its 
meeting on 16 October 2013, ENTSO-E Regional Group continental Europe 
approved the document ‘Risk assessment for the interconnection of Turkey to the 
Central European Synchronous Zone’ of Project Group Turkey, and concluded that 
the risk of interconnected operation was acceptable (ENTSOE, 2013: 16). 
4.  Comparison of the Experience of Regulation and Restructuring in the 
Greek and Turkish Electricity Industries 
First of all, it should be noted that figures up until no later than 2013 are used here, 
when, as remains the case, the restructuring efforts in the two countries had not yet 
been completed. The important restructuring measures in this study show that 
electricity prices have been quite stable over the last few years for both countries. 
Table 1 gives the data on recent electricity prices for household consumers and 
industrial consumers.  
Table 1. Electricity prices for household consumers and industrial consumers 
(Euros per kWh)   
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
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Greece 0.0975 0.0855 0.1025 0.0917 0.1065 0.1006 0.1170 0.1040 
Turkey 0.1067 0.0863 0.0978 0.0863 0.1044 0.0831 0.1186 0.0891 
Source: Eurostat (2014).  
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The data on electricity prices show that industrial customers pay lower prices 
than household consumers in Greece and Turkey, but that while that gap has 
contracted in Greece, it has slightly expanded in Turkey. Calculating the 
household/industrial price ratios for Greece and Turkey for the four years 2010-13 
shows small changes. These are 1.14, 1.11, 1.05 and 1.12 for Greece, and for 
Turkey, 1.23, 1.13, 1.25 and 1.33.   
 This suggests that electricity price levels do not reflect any price competition at 
all. Rather, the price levels reveal the Greek and Turkish government policies, 
which aim to protect electricity consumers, effectively creating a serious barrier to 
entry for new entrants and thus working against profitable investment opportunities 
in the industry. It could be suggested that the price levels are the first important 
challenge for the incumbents and potential entrants in these markets. Meanwhile, 
consumers may be adversely affected as measures are undertaken to correct for 
past mistakes. Thus, there is a somewhat paradoxical problem requiring resolution. 
There was a widespread political belief that the opening of energy markets to 
competition would lead to lower prices. This is a fallacy: prices merely reflect the 
interplay between supply and demand. The market mechanism does not guarantee 
absolute price levels. Moreover, the sector inherited a monopolistic structure from 
the past. Legal liberalisation cannot set economic realities aside. Still, confronted 
by political impatience and dissatisfaction, competition regulators and authorities 
are called upon to intervene (Woude, 2008: 27). 
Although a considerable restructuring of the electricity industries has occurred 
in Turkey and Greece since 2001, a competitive market is not yet functional. The 
electricity market in Greece is still very concentrated, because the PPC is still the 
dominant market player. There are the two main electricity generating companies 
in Turkey, which presents, therefore, quite a similar case to Greece. The biggest 
electricity producer in this country is the state-owned EUAS. Thus, market power 
may be considered as the second challenge in these countries. On the other hand, 
the negative effects of market power appear narrow because of the public 
dominance and various restrictions although, with a new market structure, some of 
the electricity generators might start to define market prices. Therefore, it may be 
possible to develop the relation between market power and high prices. This, thus, 
represents the third potential challenge for these sectors. 
Sustainable price competition in the generation market requires that generators 
have excess capacity. Even excess capacity, however, will not suffice to effect 
competition when there are few generators sharing that capacity (Haas & Auer, 
2006: 863). In the present cases, neither the Turkish nor Greek electricity sector 
have excess capacity, they also have few generators sharing the existing capacity. 
This result indicates another challenge for these markets. 
Indeed, Greece’s electricity generation has failed to meet the total net 
consumption (Table 2). Clearly, further investment in Greece’s electricity 
generation is required, but for this, investors need to be convinced about the 
78                                 A COMPARISON OF ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY REGULATION 
 
regulatory framework. Turkey electricity generation is seen to be enough to meet 
the total net consumption. 
  Table 2. Main indicators for Turkish and Greek electricity industry (2011) 
 Total Installed 
Capacity 
Electricity 
Generation 
Total Electricity 
 Net Consumption 
 (Billion Kilowatts) (Billion KWh) (Billion KWh) 
Greece 16.5343 55.96 56.372 
Turkey 53.8582 218.59 187.132,6 
  Source: IEA (2014a).   
Table 3 presents data on the number of companies representing at least 95% of 
net electricity generation at national level. In Greece, this number remained stable 
between 2003 and 2007 and slightly increased between 2008 and 2010, while in 
Turkey it declined. Table 3 does not suggest a competitive situation. 
Table 3. Number of Generating Companies Representing at least 95% of Net 
ElectricityGeneration 
   Source: Eurostat (2014).   
Table 4 shows that electricity generation gradually increased in Turkey and 
Greece between 2001 and 2008, but, slightly decreased between 2008 and 2012. 
Net electricity generation in Turkey, was quadrupled that of Greece in 2012. It can 
be suggested that electricity generation did not show a significant improvement in 
Greece since the reform year.  
Table 4. Net Electricity Generation, 2001-2012 (1000 GWh) 
Note: Gwh, gigawatt hours 
Source: Eurostat (2012, 2014).EIA (2014a). 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 : : 
Turkey 148 172 29 30 36 39 69 60 60 54 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Greece 49.7 50.6 54.3 54.9 55.7 56.5 
Turkey 116.3 123.7 135.2 145.1 155.5 169.5 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece 59.1 59.4 56.1 53.4 53.9 53.7 
Turkey 183.3 189.8 186.6 201.4 218.6 228.1 
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In order to make the electricity market work efficiently, it is very important to 
have accurate data on electricity costs. To deal with this problem, regulators should 
create and monitor mechanisms through which electricity firms should provide 
accurate information.  
Table 5. Total Number of Electricity Retailers to Final Consumers  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Greece 5 4 4 4 2 2 3 11 - 14 
Turkey 5 130 165 245 263 317 362 466 647 767 
Source: Eurostat (2014). 
 
Table 5 presents information on the total number of retailers that sold 
electricity to final customers between 2003 and 2012. While the total number of 
retailers remained quite stable, with their low number revealing an anticompetitive 
retailer structure in Greece, the total number of electricity retailers rocketed in 
Turkey (from 5 to 767 companies), suggesting a competitive improvement. 
However, checking the numbers of the major electricity retailers (Eurostat, 2014), 
it is shown to indicate rather that the retailers have monopolistic position in Greece 
and oligopolistic position in Turkey.  
Table 6 presents another important set of data for the restructuring of the 
electricity sector. This indicates that both Turkey and Greece were able to achieve 
a significant reduction in electricity transmission and distribution losses following 
reform. The transmission and distribution losses rate of these countries electricity 
sector in 2011 is actually lower than it was at the beginning of the reform year. 
Clearly, the restructuring and regulation efforts made a positive contribution in this 
area. 
Table 6. Electric Power Distribution Loss (% of output) 
Year TURKEY GREECE 
2001 19.00916684 9.314944608 
2002 18.49459042 7.376031143 
2003 17.10899766 8.507037389 
2004 15.42356236 8.839882339 
2005 14.84600756 9.419960624 
2006 14.07268334 8.474717094 
2007 13.91066935 7.749836552 
2008 13.85005393 8.031854018 
2009 14.88152681 5.275477134 
2010 14.30911708 6.594383531 
2011 14.11071829 4.765767593 
Source:  The World Bank (2014). 
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Table 7 shows regulatory scores which give a cross comparison of the two 
cases and the recent indicators of their performance in a number of area. The 
electricity industries became gradually more competitive in the two countries after 
2003, as shown by the entry and vertical integration scores. The public ownership 
indicator, however, shows a contrary result. Additionally, the structure indicator 
presents a still anticompetitive market structure, although this has shown 
improvement since 2001. The regulatory scores are not very different between the 
two countries. It may be suggested, therefore, that the less restrictive structure may 
not guarantee a competitive electricity market at all. Anticompetitive structure and 
conduct can be results of barriers to entry and public ownership. Based on this 
knowledge, it can be asserted that there are contradictions between the reform 
programme aims and their implementation results in both countries. Thus, their 
reform programmes and also their implementation methods should be revised. 
Table 7. Comparison of Greek and Turkish Electricity Restructuring and 
Regulation Performance  
Years Entry Public 
Ownership 
Vertical 
Integration 
Sector 
Indicator 
 Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey 
1990 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1991 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1992 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1993 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1994 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1995 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1996 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1997 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1998 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
1999 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.0 
2000 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.5 6.0 5.5 6.0 
2001 2.3 4.0 6.0 6.0 4.5 1.5 4.3 3.8 
2002 2.3 2.3 4.5 6.0 1.5 1.5 2.8 3.3 
2003 2.3 0.3 4.5 6.0 1.5 1.5 2.8 2.6 
2004 2.3 0.3 4.5 6.0 1.5 1.5 2.8 2.6 
2005 0.3 0.3 4.5 6.0 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.6 
2006 0.3 0.3 4.5 6.0 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.6 
2007 0.3 0.3 4.5 6.0 1.5 0.0 2.1 2.1 
Source: OECD (2012). 
Note: 0 to 6 scale from least to most restrictrive of competition. These indicators are described in: 
Conway, P. and G.Nicoletti  (2006). 
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When the policy changes in the Greek and Turkish electricity sectors are 
evaluated, both existing and potential problems are identified. Unfortunately, no 
substantial adjustments have been made to cope with the challenges that have been 
revealed. The power and responsibilities of the (Greek) RAE are narrower than 
those of the (Turkish) EMRA, it may also be noted. The RAE requires wider 
powers and greater autonomy in exerting them. 
Electricity reform in the two countries is still in the transitional period. 
However, instead of continuing to move forward, they have both postponed their 
plans due to various internal and external economic and political factors. 
Therefore, inevitably, adjustments in policy, operational paradigm and institutional 
reform will become necessary.  
As Kalantzis and Sakellaris (2012: 8) state, policy makers should continuously 
monitor the results of these reforms and be prepared to modify or even cancel 
reforms that do not lead to the expected results Turkey and Greece should take this 
advice into consideration, and they should strengthen their implementation of its 
recommendations.  
Clearly, when the two countries come to the end of transitional period, they will 
still require a deregulation process. Hence, they need to look beyond the 
transitional period. 
Conclusion 
Although considerable restructuring of the electricity industries has occurred in 
Greece and Turkey, it has not been completed and a competitive market has not 
been functional yet. Both countries’ electricity industries are facing the challenge 
of completing the liberalisation process regarding price levels and existing and 
potential market power in the generation and retailer segments. These challenges 
require an industry that is strong in terms of independent regulatory conduct and 
thus capable of making strong commitments.  
In summary, the electricity industries in Turkey and Greece have undergone a 
radical restructuring, which is still an ongoing process. There is a requirement for 
persistent work. Electricity industry restructuring and regulation is a complex task, 
and policymakers clearly need to continue their efforts toward competitive and 
more efficient electricity industries. Most importantly, the institutional and 
political reforms that can ensure the smooth functioning of the electricity industries 
need to be enacted. Policymakers will need to face the facts to find systemic 
solutions rather than taking politically safe and opportunistic actions. A debate 
about regulatory principles for the Greek and Turkish electricity markets is 
crucially needed, in which, alongside the essential objectives of customer 
protection and ensuring fair competition, concepts such as regulator independence, 
results-orientation and investment incentives must also be key elements. 
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Öz 
Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ) Kamu Alımları Anlaşması (KAA) dünya 
ticaretinin serbestleştirilmesine katkı yapmayı ve kamu ihale piyasasını 
uluslararası ticaret kurallarının kapsamı altına almayı amaçlamaktadır. Şu anda 
42 ülke bu Anlaşmaya taraf olmuştur. Anlaşma bir kamu ihalesine katılan 
işletmeleri doğrudan muhatap alan çeşitli düzenlemeler içermesi itibariyle yeni bir 
çığır açmıştır. Anlaşma, kendi kapsamına giren ihalelerde, taraf ülkelerin ve 
tedarikçilerinin yararına olacak şekilde ayırımcılık yapılması yasağı, ulusal 
muamele, en çok kayırılan ülke ve şeffaflık prensiplerini temel almaktadır. Acaba 
bu işletmeler KAA’nın ilgili hükümlerini gerekçe göstererek Avrupa Birliği (AB) 
hukuku bağlamında bu hükümlerin uygulanmasını talep edebilirler mi? Ya da bu 
işletmeler KAA’dan kaynaklanan haklarını ancak AB yasa koyucusunun kendi iç 
hukukunu (AB hukukunu) KAA’ya uyumlaştırdığı oranda ve bu Anlaşma 
kapsamında kalan yabancı işletmelere Anlaşmada uygulanması öngörülen usuller 
doğrultusunda mı ileri sürebilecektir? Bu makale okuyucuya KAA hakkında genel 
bir bakış sağlamakta ve KAA’nın temel niteliklerini gözden geçirmektedir. Bunun 
yanı sıra makale, KAA’nın bazı hükümlerinin AB Üye Devletlerinin ulusal 
mahkemelerinde uygulanmasını ileri sürme sorununu da tartışmaktadır. Makalenin 
ilk kısmı DTÖ KAA’yı uluslararası kamu ihale mevzuatı bağlamında analiz etmekte 
ve bu açıdan önemli noktalara değinmektedir. İkinci kısım, KAA’nın hukuki niteliği 
ve temel özelliklerini incelemektedir.  
Anahtar kelimeler: Dünya Ticaret Örgütü, Kamu Alımları Anlaşması, kamu 
ihaleleri, ayırımcılık yapma yasağı, şeffaflık, ticaretin serbestleştirilmesi.  
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